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Chapter 11
Looking Ahead: Tomorrow’s 
Innovations Built on Today’s 
Foundation 
Creativity is not the finding of a thing, but the making of something out 
of it after it is found.
—James Russell Lowell
Up to this point, this book has revealed the technical details of Intel’s security and 
management engine, with the focus on the architecture and design of its firmware 
infrastructure. For the past several years, the engine has been serving as the trusted 
computing base of many state-of-the-art security technologies delivered by Intel 
platforms. Looking ahead, more innovative creations are to be done on the engine to 
make the most out of it. What are the next big things to come?
This chapter wraps up the book by first reviewing the critical building blocks of the 
engine and then briefly brainstorming next-generation technologies that can be built on 
the engine to further improve the security computing experience for people.
Isolated Computing Environment
The embedded engine was initially introduced by Intel in the south bridge as a 
management engine to resolve the hard problem of enterprise network administration. 
Managing, maintaining, and supporting network computers in organizations used to 
be stressful and expensive. For example, when an end-point computer has crashed, the 
information technology technician often has to make an onsite visit and debug the issue. 
Furthermore, monitoring statuses of all computers on a network is a difficult task.
Various software and hardware management solutions come with their advantages 
and disadvantages. To summarize, the cost of software tools is relatively low; however, 
software suffers constraints that cannot be easily overcome, such as security and 
dependency on the operating system. On the other hand, hardware methods are 
stable, more robust against attacks, and independent of the system under debug, but 
unfortunately, their higher price tags have prevented them from widespread deployment. 
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Intel’s AMT1 (advanced management technology)—built on the management 
engine and a key feature of Intel vPro—is both hardware and software. The AMT is 
hardware because it is natively embedded as part of the computer’s chipset; it operates 
independently of the host operating system; and more importantly, its security is rooted 
in the hardware. The AMT is also software because the majority of its functionalities are 
realized by specific software programs that are compiled into the platform’s flash device. 
Thanks to its dual identity, the AMT enjoys both the stability, security, and independency 
of hardware solutions, and the flexibility and affordability of software solutions at the 
same time.
The security and management engine features a dedicated processor, backbone 
hardware, fuse blocks, memory, and nonvolatile storage. It is designed to run normally, 
regardless of the state of the host. It can communicate with the host operating system 
and access the host’s physical memory (with certain exceptions). The engine’s isolation 
nature makes it significantly less vulnerable to threats and attacks from the host. 
Therefore, it is an ideal location for not only platform-level management and security 
solutions, but also those security applications that require the root of trust to be protected 
in hardware. 
Nothing is perfect, and the engine has its disadvantages and limitations. For 
instance, to save power and prolong battery life, its clock frequency is set to hundreds 
of megahertz, much lower than that of processor cores on the main host system. The 
slower speed disallows the engine to meet performance targets of certain operations 
(for example, video gaming) that require extremely high throughput. Also, the engine 
has been designed to execute Intel-signed programs only. In the current architecture, it 
cannot yet be utilized as a generic trusted execution environment.
Security-Hardening Measures
The engine’s capability of safeguarding itself and the sensitive data it handles is critical 
because of its assigned tasks and deep privileges, especially the right to read and write the 
host memory and its responsibility in processing high-value assets for many applications. 
In order to safeguard it from being compromised, comprehensive hardening 
measures are applied during boot-time and runtime. The following describes a few 
examples at a high level:
•	 Hardware root of trust: Binary code and the data of firmware 
components are stored in the flash memory in the clear. 
Encryption is not used because the security architecture does 
not rely on security through obscurity. The concept of hardware 
root of trust contains two folds: first, the root of trust for integrity 
is a hardware ROM (read-only memory). Unlike the firmware in 
the flash memory, the binary of ROM by design is not available 
externally. Although, even if the code of ROM is leaked, the 
security of the engine should not be impacted; second, the EPID 
(enhanced privacy identification; see Chapter 5 for details) private 
key and other chipset keys are burned into the engine’s security 
fuse block in Intel’s factory. These keys comprise the root of trust 
for confidentiality and privacy for the engine.
Chapter 11 ■ Looking ahead: tomorrow’s innovations BuiLt on today’s Foundation 
229
•	 Signed firmware: Intel digitally signs the firmware image that 
is loaded by the ROM from the flash. The ROM verifies Intel’s 
signature during the boot process. The hash of the public key for 
signature verification is hardcoded in the ROM. Applets loaded by 
the dynamic application loader (DAL; see Chapter 9 for details) 
are also signed by Intel with the same key and verified when being 
loaded to the engine.
•	 Intact internal memory: The engine’s internal memory is intact 
from probing from the external world.
•	 Protected external memory: Due to the limited capacity of the 
internal memory, some versions of the engine require a reserved 
region of the host DRAM (dynamic random-access memory) to 
function. Because the DRAM is not in the engine’s trust boundary, 
before being swapped to the DRAM, data pages are encrypted; 
both data and code pages are integrity protected. There is no 
point in encrypting code pages because they are available in the 
clear from the flash memory at rest.
•	 Protected nonvolatile storage: The engine’s firmware may store 
secrets in the flash memory with protection for confidentiality, 
integrity, and/or anti-replay. The cryptographic keys utilized in 
these protections are derived from unique security fuses that 
differ from part to part.
•	 Restrictive DMA (direct memory access) control: The engine can 
access the host operating system’s memory via its DMA devices. 
This powerful ability may be leveraged by malicious firmware 
applications to bypass memory protection mechanisms of the 
host. To reduce the possibility of abuse, DMA operations with 
the host memory are stringently controlled by a small privileged 
component in the engine’s kernel.
•	 Task isolation: The number of the engine’s firmware modules 
has been growing over the years. To preclude one compromised 
module from attacking other innocent modules, an embedded 
task isolation mechanism is applied. Essentially, the isolation 
architecture places a module in its own container and restricts its 
penetration into peer containers. Assets that are protected against 
being accessed by other containers include hardware devices, 
runtime memory, nonvolatile data, synchronization objects, and 
so forth.
•	 Page attributes: All pages of the engine’s logical memory are 
tagged with attributes that are configured by the kernel during 
the boot process. The attribute entries are whether a page is code 
(executable) or data (nonexecutable), read-only, read-and-write, 
or no-access, the task it belongs to, and so on.
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•	 Return address scrambling: For a function call, the return address 
that is stored in the stack is “scrambled” (exclusive-OR’ed) 
with a secret value that is randomly generated during the boot 
process and stored in a protected register. The prologue function 
calculates the scrambled return address and places it in the stack. 
Accordingly, the epilogue function first performs unscrambling 
and then jumps to the unscrambled address, if and only if 
the unscrambled address looks valid. With the return address 
scrambling in place, malware cannot easily take advantage 
of stack overflow bugs and instruct the processor to execute 
attacker’s code that is located at a specific address.
•	 Stack DMZ (demilitarized zone): Stack overflowing is commonly 
used by attackers. When creating the stack for a thread, the 
engine’s kernel reserves extra pages (analogous to a DMZ) that 
are marked as “no-access” in the page attribute table. The attack 
of overflowing a stack will trigger an access violation exception if 
it lands on the DMZ.
The engine’s reaction upon detection of a security violation varies depending on 
the presumed nature of the event. Minor violations may be logged and then ignored 
quietly. Some violations that can be a result of firmware bugs would trigger a self-reset 
of the engine. If a certain number of resets happen within a certain number of seconds, 
then the engine will enter a recovery mode and stop functioning. The engine responds to 
security violations that are very likely due to active attacks with ungraceful global reset in 
order to terminate the attack immediately. Figure 11-1 summarizes the aforementioned 
countermeasures into categories.
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Figure 11-1. The engine’s security-hardening features
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As you can see from the list and Figure 11-1, the philosophy of defense in depth is 
exercised when designing the protection profile of the security and management engine. 
This means that the security of the engine tries not to rely on any single hardening 
measure. Consequently, a successful invasion must manage to turn down multiple 
fortifications, which considerably raises the difficulty of attack attempts. 
For example, to install a rootkit that intends to access the host’s system memory 
from the engine, an attack has to circumvent integrity protection, inject malicious code 
to one of the firmware modules, avoid being caught by runtime integrity checks, and then 
bypass the kernel’s DMA permission filter. It is definitely a tremendous task to go through 
all of these defenses without triggering the alarm of the engine’s security infrastructure.
Note ■  try to avoid relying on single hardening measures; always exercise defense in 
depth when architecting security solutions.
Another example of exercising the philosophy of defense in depth is reflected in the 
well-known FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) 140-2 standard2 published 
by the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). For a software or firmware 
module, the standard requires, among other things, a series of self-tests during the boot 
process:
•	 An integrity test using, for example, a digital signature to make 
sure that the module’s binary image has not been altered.
•	 Known-answer tests for all cryptography algorithms supported 
by the module, minus the algorithm that was just checked in 
the integrity test. A known-answer test calls the underlying 
cryptography method with hardcoded input vectors and verifies 
that the output from the method matches the hardcoded expected 
result.
One can argue that the known-answer tests are redundant because, in theory, once 
the integrity test passes, the sequential known-answer tests that follow are impossible 
to fail. However, from a different angle, this double-insurance requirement can also be 
interpreted as a defense-in-depth strategy. For example, buffer overflow vulnerability 
or the like may exist in the integrity self-test implementation. An attacker that has 
intentionally modified the module to his benefit can possibly exploit such a bug and 
bypass the integrity self-test. The known-answer self-tests offer secondary defense to 
defeat the attack.
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Basic Utilities
The following lists the majority of the engine’s fundamental and generic functions 
that are widely needed by many applications. These have been discussed in previous 
chapters:
Most standard cryptography algorithms•	
Big-number arithmetic•	
Secure timer•	
Monotonic counter (increments by one when instructed, never •	
decrements)
Secure nonvolatile storage•	
DMA with the host (limited to select modules only) and within •	
the firmware memory
HECI (host-embedded communication interface)•	
Network interface, limited to select modules only•	
Field programmable fuses (FPF)•	
Secure firmware update•	
In addition, the infrastructure supports runtime debug for applications on both 
preproduction and production configurations. On production parts, variables that hold 
secret data or keys are replaced with zeroes or test values by the kernel as soon as the 
debug port is enabled.
Besides these basic methods, the security and management engine is equipped with 
several useful utilities in its extended infrastructure that are exclusively available on the 
engine for supporting platform-specific functions of upper-layer applications. 
Anonymous Authentication and Secure Session 
Establishment
The EPID is an anonymous attestation and authentication scheme. It allows a verifier, 
which may be a local software program or a remote server, to use a group public key to 
verify a platform’s membership of the group by examining the signature generated by 
the platform using its unique EPID private key. The authentication does not disclose 
the identity of the platform. The membership of an individual platform may be revoked 
under predefined circumstances, such as a detected compromise. 
The SIGMA (SIGn and Message Authentication) is a protocol for mutual 
authentication and session key establishment. In the authentication phase, one direction 
(from the platform to the verifier) uses EPID, which is anonymous; whereas the other 
direction uses the traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) where a chain of certificates 
signed by certification authorities and rooted to the EPID authority prove the verifier’s 
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identity. For the session key agreement stage, the ECDH (elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman) 
protocol is employed. To further raise the security bar, the SIGMA protocol can be 
configured to involve OCSP (online certificate status protocol) for the platform to be 
confident that the verifier’s PKI certificate has not been revoked. 
All recent releases of the security and management engine ship with an EPID 
private key in security fuses. The EPID and SIGMA are building blocks of many attractive 
features, for example, the Intel Identity Protection Technology3 (IPT). For authentication, 
verifying the engine’s authenticity is important to applications that take advantage of the 
engine’s built-in functionalities. For session key agreement, the SIGMA protocol provides 
a convenient and secure approach to protect application-specific communications 
between a trusted entity and the platform, while maintaining the anonymity and 
confidentiality of the latter.
One of the potential problems of EPID is the heavy mathematical operations that 
must be conducted by the verifier and the platform. They slow down the SIGMA protocol 
execution and arguably worsen the user’s experience. One feasible solution without 
introducing more computing resources is to have both the verifier and the platform save 
the encryption and integrity keys derived from a successful SIGMA session in their secure 
nonvolatile storage, respectively. This process is called pairing. The session keys resulted 
from pairing are used in future sessions, even across power cycles. The session keys may 
be renewed by either side requesting a new SIGMA session once a month, for example, 
to mitigate attacks against persistent keys and, at the same time, minimize the negative 
impact of SIGMA to the user’s experience.
Protected Input and Output
Input (keyboard, mouse, fingerprint sensor, microphone, and so on) and output (for 
example, monitor and speaker) devices (I/O devices) constitute the interfaces that 
connect the human being and the machine. With a user-oriented mindset, safeguarding 
I/O devices is vital for solutions to any security problems. To realize secure input and 
output, the I/O devices may be connected with the security and management engine 
without involvement or interference of the host software. The host cannot access the clear 
I/O data because it is encrypted, and the decryption key is known to only the processing 
device and the engine. 
Intel’s PAVP (protected audio and video path) initially invented for supporting 
Blu-ray playback is a prototype for protected audio and video output. To display a secret 
frame, the creator encrypts the frame and transmits the encrypted frame to the graphics 
processor, which then decrypts and displays it on the screen. The key or the clear frame 
is not visible to the host. The link between the video output port and the monitor is 
protected by the wired or wireless HDCP4 (high-bandwidth digital content protection) 
protocol. Bypassing the entire software stack is the ultimate mitigation against all types of 
I/O snooping attacks and it renders all malware on the host that aims at stealing the user’s 
sensitive data through I/O ports inoperable. 
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Dynamic Application Loader
The security and management engine comes with a number of features stored on the 
flash chip. But they are not nearly enough to make the most out of the engine’s rich set of 
capabilities. The DAL offers desirable flexibility and extends the boundary of the engine 
by loading Java applets to the engine from the host at runtime. As software, it is easier 
to create an applet, change its functionalities, and patch bugs. No firmware update is 
necessary for building new consumer features to the engine.
But some usages are not suitable for loading by the DAL. Generally, if a feature falls 
into one or more of the following categories, then it should be natively implemented in 
the firmware: 
Related to platform security, for example, Boot Guard and •	
firmware-based TPM5 (Trusted Platform Module). The defined 
objectives of the platform security features include measuring 
the integrity of the host, thus they must be running before the 
operating system is loaded.
Related to system manageability, for example, AMT.•	
Must be available even if the host is not running, for example, •	
AMT and Remote Wake.6
Require high data throughput.•	
Code size is large.•	
Despite these limitations, consumer security features that launch on the operating 
system can still make good use of the engine through the DAL. Intel IPT sets a great 
example. Running new applets through the DAL, or other similar and better interfaces to 
be explored, will be one of the main domains for functional expansion of the engine in 
the future.
Summary of Firmware Ingredients 
Figure 11-2 shows a summary of the security and management engine’s firmware 
components. Notice that it is not an exhaustive list. Also notice that the engine may 
feature different sets of components for different products. As an example, the Bay Trail 
series tablets do not support AMT.
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Most of the firmware ingredients shown in the figure have been discussed in 
previous chapters. The following have not been mentioned or described in detail. 
•	 Big-number arithmetic: Implements signed and unsigned addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, division, modulo, Montgomery 
reduction, greatest common divisor, least common multiple, and 
so forth. These arithmetic operations are extensively invoked by 
asymmetric-key cryptography, for example, the EPID.
•	 Capability licensing service (CLS): Allows a remote trusted server 
to provision platform-specific permits and credentials to the 
engine. A sample usage of CLS is the Intel Upgrade Service (end of 
life in 2011) that unlocks advanced CPU (central processing unit) 
capabilities such as hyperthreading.
•	 Integrated clock control: Supports enablement and configuration 
of CPU overclocking.
•	 Remote wake: Supports waking up a computer from the sleep or 
off state from a remote location, so the user can access files on the 































Figure 11-2. The engine’s firmware components
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To realize its functionality, a firmware module may consume peers of the same box 
and modules in boxes below it. For example, IPT relies on DAL, and DAL depends on 
EPID/SIGMA and PAVP in the extended infrastructure, as well as cryptography, HECI, 
and other drivers in the basic infrastructure. However, a module does not consume a 
module in the boxes that are above it. For example, the drivers in the basic infrastructure 
box do not rely on upper-layer modules to function. 
At this point, we have covered the basics of today’s security and management engine. 
The framework is mature. The building blocks are well-established and ready to work for 
newer and better things. Next, let us explore future opportunities to make something out 
of the engine in more applications. 
Software Guard Extensions
At the 2013 Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, 
researchers from Intel presented three papers describing an upcoming technology, Intel 
Software Guard Extensions (SGX), for securing software secrets and executions. 
•	 “Innovative instructions and software model for isolated 
execution.”7 This article introduces the SGX’s central concept 
of “enclave” and gives an overview of the SGX architecture and 
protection model. It also describes new CPU instructions for 
SGX, new hardware for handling the enclave page cache, and the 
processes for enclave creation and operation, including how an 
application transitions in and out of its enclave.
•	 “Innovative technology for CPU-based attestation and sealing.” 8 
This presentation explains the technical details of provisioning 
secrets to an enclave, including how to generate hardware-based 
attestation for software inside an enclave and how software in an 
enclave seals and unseals secret data.
•	 “Using innovative instructions to create trustworthy software 
solutions.”9 This paper focuses on the software programming 
model of SGX. Interestingly, for proof of concept, the authors 
had built on prototype hardware of SGX three trustworthy 
applications, namely, one-time password, enterprise rights 
management, and secure video conferencing. These three are 
perfect examples for demonstration, because they are highly-
demanded real-world applications that exercise many of the 
SGX’s infrastructural capabilities.
In a nutshell, the SGX technology enables software developers to protect sensitive 
code and data in enclaves that are secured at the hardware level. The protection includes 
encryption, integrity, and anti-replay. No software on the host, regardless of its ring and 
privilege, is allowed to touch others’ enclaves. Moreover, the hardware can measure 
the trusted code in an enclave and generate attestation, so that a trusted entity, such 
as a service provider, is able to confirm the integrity of the code and provide premium 
services.
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Notice the word “innovation” appearing in the titles of all three papers. Running 
sensitive portions of a software program in the trusted world is not a new idea. However, 
compared to existing solutions, the SGX’s innovation is its capability of managing 
multiple secure enclaves, mutually untrusted, concurrently in the untrusted world. The 
CPU-based attestation and sealing are also innovative creations, which function like a 
dedicated TPM for each individual enclave.
In September 2013, Intel officially announced the SGX feature and published a 
programming reference manual.10 The SGX is seemingly a very promising technology 
that is tasked with resolving long-lasting security problems for the software vendors and 
consumers. Its design is not trivial. Behind the scene are a number of hardware, firmware, 
and software components working together to make the SGX a reality. The security and 
management engine also plays a pivotal role in the solution. 
The SGX architecture makes use of the engine through the generic DAL interface. 
Individual enclaves can invoke the engine’s wide range of capabilities, including the 
cryptography driver, monotonic counter, secure timer, PAVP, and so forth. As the 
development of SGX continues, other services available from the engine may also be 
leveraged. 
More Excitement to Come
The future development of the security and management engine can move forward in 
two directions. The first is to expand the family of platform-level features. By their nature, 
these features cannot be implemented on the host operating system because either 
the software stack is not trusted or the function must be available even though the host 
is not active. The engine’s unique characteristics of isolation environment should be 
further utilized to realize security enforcements for the platform, as well as nonsecurity 
applications that require operations in the sleep state. 
Second, the DAL is a milestone development that opens the door of the security and 
management engine to the external world. It has been used for Intel IPT and will be used 
for SGX. With the increasing openness of the engine, software vendors and computer 
manufacturers should be able to develop proprietary and innovative features that make 
use of the engine’s infrastructure. 
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